

~~TOP SECRET~~

file

25X1



16 August 1960

25X1

Copy No. C Ed 7.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 40
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. A
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 70-2

DATE: 9 JUN 1980 REVIEWER:

25X1

25X1

State Dept. review completed

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200400001-9

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200400001-9

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200400001-9

LATE ITEM

*Laos: The Ambassador reports that, although motions are being made for the legal establishment of a new government, the disintegration of power will be complete and there will be no responsible authority in Vientiane able to enforce its rule. He adds that leaflets have just been dropped on Vientiane announcing that General Phoumi intends to retake the city by force. He is seriously considering the immediate evacuation of dependents if, and as soon as, the cooperation of the Kong Le coup group can be secured.

L
A
T
E

T
E
M

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200400001-9

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200400001-9

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200400001-9

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

16 August 1960

DAILY BRIEF

25X1

25X1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Laos: Premier-designate Souvanna Phouma is expected to form a broadly based coalition government which will probably include some members of the ousted Somsanith government.

the new cabinet will not contain any military figures, and the Ministry of Defense will be returned to civilian control. Souvanna will probably exercise close personal supervision over foreign affairs and defense matters, in line with his often-expressed view that if the situation in Laos is to be stabilized, a neutral policy and the reduction of the army's role in internal affairs are necessary.

25X1

No

Somsanith and most of the Luang Prabang contingent of his ousted government are in Vientiane, where they are probably participating in the consultations looking to the formation of a new government. One exception is ex-Foreign Minister Khamphan Panya, who reportedly has gone to southern Laos to join General Phoumi. The latter is not known to have abandoned his plans to force a return to the status quo ante.

Meanwhile, the Kong Le group gives little sign as yet of relaxing its military grip on Vientiane and may attempt to hold on until a government to its satisfaction receives assembly approval.

25X1 Congo: [New moves planned by Lumumba to bolster his internal position have an authoritarian character. These reportedly will include the suspension of judicial procedures in favor of trial by military tribunal and passage of a law requiring that licenses for newspapers and periodicals be renewed every two months.] A major internal crisis for Lumumba appears to have been averted by postponement of the Abako party's convention scheduled for 13 August, at which the Abako had been expected to declare the lower Congo region independent of the Lumumba government. Lumumba also may avoid an early showdown concerning the political status of Katanga in the expectation that a scheduled meeting of independent African states in Leopoldville from 25 to 30 August will take a strong stand in favor of a unified Congo. *6K*

[*UN Secretary General Hammarskjold on 15 August summoned a new meeting of the Security Council following Lumumba's charge that the Congo had "lost confidence" in Hammarskjold. In an effort to retain the propaganda initiative, Lumumba also called for the dispatch of a 14-nation UN commission to oversee the withdrawal of Belgian troops.]

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200400001-9

Afghanistan-Pakistan: Afghan-Pakistani tensions will increase sharply following the forcing down of two Pakistani "Fury" fighters at Kandahar inside Afghanistan. The Afghan Government has stated the planes were based near Peshawar. The incident will harden attitudes on both sides and prevent any improvement of relations in the near future. Kabul, and probably Moscow, will exploit the incident as "proof" of Pakistan's aggressive intentions and may link the Pakistani incursion with US military support for Pakistan.

OK

25X1

*Middle East Oil: Arab governments are reacting strongly to Esso Export's 9 August cut in posted prices for Middle East crude oil of 4 to 14 cents per barrel. Although other companies have not yet reduced their crude-oil postings, Shell and British Petroleum Company have already cut prices of oil products. Further cuts in crude prices appear certain. The Kuwaiti Government has just asked Abdullah Tariki, Saudi oil administrator, to call an emergency meeting of all Arab oil producers for a

OK

16 Aug 60

DAILY BRIEF

iii

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200400001-9

25X1

conference on oil profits and some form of world-wide market-sharing arrangements. A major cut in crude prices is expected in Venezuela, even though the minister of mines and hydrocarbons has argued for cutting production rather than prices. [redacted]

25X1
25X1

III. THE WEST

Cuba: The eighth national congress of the Popular Socialist (Communist) party of Cuba opens on 16 August with the attendance of relatively high party officials from France, Italy, and most countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc. The congress, the first since 1952, was apparently scheduled to coincide with the OAS foreign ministers' meetings in Costa Rica this week and is likely to be a demonstration of international Communist solidarity with the Castro regime in its "struggle against American imperialism." [redacted]

OK

25X1

LATE ITEM

*South Korea: Kim To-yun, who has been nominated by newly elected President Yun for prime minister of South Korea, probably will need the support of independents and former Rhee elements to win lower-house approval. Kim, a leader of the right-wing faction of the majority Democratic party, is strongly opposed by Chang Myon, titular party chief who controls approximately half the Democratic members of the House of Representatives. Exclusion of Chang's supporters from the new cabinet would widen the intraparty breach and could lead to government instability. [redacted]

OK

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200400001-9

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200400001-9

25X1

Situation in Laos

Laotian Premier-designate Souvanna Phouma will probably try to form a broadly based "national unity" government which may range from such left-wing neutralist figures as Bong Souvannavong and Santiphab party leader Quinim Pholsena to some members of the ousted Somsanith government. Souvanna is likely to draw heavily on his own party--the Rally of the Lao People (RLP)--as a roughly representative middle ground between left-wing elements and the strongly anti-Communist Committee for Defense of National Interests (CDNI). The CDNI, with its strong influence in the army through General Phoumi, may go into a period of eclipse.

25X1

the new cabinet will not include any military figures [redacted] the Ministry of Defense itself will be placed under civilian control. The defense portfolio in the two previous governments had been held by Generals Sounthone and Phoumi, respectively, both of whom were CDNI leaders. In addition, ex-Premier Somsanith has stated, [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] that one of the first acts of the new government will be the reorganization of the general staff. Souvanna has long felt that the army was playing a disproportionate role in the central government's efforts to stabilize the countryside, and he can be expected to exercise close policy guidance over defense matters. He will also undoubtedly devote much attention to foreign affairs, in line with his view that strict neutrality is the only feasible policy for Laos.

25X1

Somsanith and most of the Luang Prabang contingent of his ousted government now are in Vientiane and are presumably participating in the consultations looking to the formation of the new government. One exception is ex-Foreign Minister Khamphan Pan-ya, who reportedly is joining General Phoumi in southern Laos and who, along with Phoumi, has probably been a major target of the forces supporting the Vientiane coup. Phoumi, meanwhile, has indicated no abandonment of his plans to undo the coup by military force.

The Kong Le coup group gives little sign as yet of relaxing its military grip on Vientiane despite the fact that its immediate aims

25X1

appear largely to have been attained. Ever since negotiations for a settlement began, this group has been deeply suspicious of trickery on the part of the Somsanith government. Kong Le may keep control of Vientiane until a government to his satisfaction receives assembly approval.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200400001-9
The Situation in the Congo

Postponement by the Abako party of a convention originally scheduled for 13-16 August appears to have averted a major internal crisis for Congolese Premier Lumumba. The Abako on 7 August had passed a resolution of no confidence in the Lumumba government, and the convention reportedly was to have been the occasion for the Abako to declare the lower Congo region independent of the central government. Although the reason for the postponement is unclear, it may have resulted from pressure by Lumumba on Abako leader and Congo President Joseph Kasavubu.

With Kasavubu seemingly unwilling to oppose Lumumba, the focal point for anti-Lumumba activity may once again become the Congo Senate, whose moderate president, Joseph Ileo, has become increasingly critical of the premier. The Senate, which has been in adjournment since 22 July, is scheduled to reconvene on 16 August.

25X1

[The Lumumba government continues to implement measures designed to suppress internal opposition. These include the suspension of judicial procedures in favor of trial by military tribunals and passage of a law requiring that licenses for newspapers and periodicals be renewed every two months. Congolese officials earlier had closed down the facilities of the Belgian and French news agencies in Leopoldville.]

Lumumba may avoid an early showdown concerning the political status of Katanga in anticipation that a scheduled meeting of independent African states in Leopoldville from 25 to 30 August will take a strong stand in favor of a unified Congo.

25X1

[UN Secretary General Hammarskjold on 15 August summoned a new Security Council meeting--expected to be held Wednesday or Thursday--following Lumumba's charges earlier in the day that the Congo had "lost confidence" in Hammarskjold. In an effort to retain the propaganda initiative, Lumumba also called for the dispatch of a 14-nation UN commission--Ghana, Guinea, Tunisia, Morocco, Ethiopia, the UAR, Sudan, Ceylon, Liberia, Mali, Burma, India, Afghanistan, and Lebanon--to oversee the withdrawal of Belgian troops.]

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200400001-9

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200400001-9

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200400001-9

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200400001-9

Pakistani Fighters Forced Down Inside Afghanistan

Afghan-Pakistani tensions presumably will increase sharply following the forcing down of two Pakistani "Fury" fighters inside Afghan territory. The two British-made piston aircraft probably were overflying Pushtoon tribal areas inside the Afghan border when intercepted by Afghan MIG-17 jet fighters and were then forced to proceed to Kandahar. The Afghan Government has stated that the planes had taken off from Miram Shah airfield, in the Pakistani frontier region south of Peshawar.

Kabul and probably Moscow are likely to exploit the incident as "proof" of Pakistan's aggressive intentions and may link it with US military support for Pakistan.

25X1

They now may try to draw comparisons between the two incidents. Kabul's propaganda will probably reach a high pitch while Afghanistan's tribal chiefs are gathered in the capital for the national independence celebrations in late August.

Afghan Prime Minister Daud may privately welcome the incident as demonstrating Afghanistan's improved defensive capability resulting from his policy of accepting Soviet military assistance. Pakistan, on the other hand, now may feel obliged to find a way of demonstrating that it remains a stronger military power than Afghanistan.

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200400001-9

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200400001-9

Cuban Communist Party Congress to Be Attended by Strong Delegations from Abroad

The eighth national congress of the Popular Socialist (Communist) party of Cuba opens on 16 August. The congress, the first since 1952, had been set for last month and was rescheduled only recently, suggesting that it was timed to coincide with the OAS foreign ministers' meetings in Costa Rica this week. The congress is likely to be used as a demonstration of international Communist solidarity with the Castro regime in its "struggle against American imperialism." Attendance of Communists from the Sino-Soviet bloc at the Cuban Communist meeting is likely to encourage the apparent willingness of most American governments to condemn "extracontinental intervention" in the affairs of the western hemisphere.

Most of the Sino-Soviet bloc countries will be represented by relatively high-level delegations. The USSR, Communist China, Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, and North Korea are sending central committee members, journalists, and persons skilled in agitation and propaganda techniques. Rumors that the bloc delegations would include top party officials have not been borne out as yet. Paul Verner, candidate member of the East German politburo, is the highest ranking bloc party official known to have arrived for the meeting.

25X1

Jacques Duclos, second-ranking official of the French party, and Velio Spano, a member of the Italian Communist party central committee, arrived in Havana on 13 August.

25X1

The foreign Communist delegations undoubtedly will use this opportunity to strengthen the Communist position in Cuba with the aim of using that country as a base for further penetration in Latin America.

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200400001-9

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200400001-9

25X1

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/11/11 : GUNNAR - 0075A005200400001-9

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/11/11 : GUNNAR - 0075A005200400001-9